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Although this essay features some predictions about likely outcomes of the 2010 election for the US House of Representatives, the underlying statistical model is meant to be structural or causal and is not targeted on forecasting accuracy. My analysis draws upon founding concepts in Gerald H. Kramer 
subject to the restriction that 0 1; where HS t denotes the number of House seats won by the party of the president (the 'in-party') at midterm election quarter t HS t 8 is the number of House seats won by the time t in-party at the previous on-year election (the last presidential election), eight quarters ago at time t 8 P V t 8 is the percentage point margin of the two-party vote received by the sitting president at the previous presidential election, eight quarters ago at time t 8
1 Citation sources of the foregoing appear at the References list below.
R t j are quarter-on-quarter changes, expressed at annual percentage rates, of per capita Disposable Personal Income de ‡ated by the Consumer Price Index (R); computed log e (R t =R t 1 ) 400:
The autoregressive term HS t 8 aims to pick up the net impact on the number of seats won by the in-party at midterms of the institutional advantages enjoyed by incumbents in the US's single-member district, constituency service-oriented legislative system. The magnitude of the incumbent president's vote margin in the previous presidential election, P V t 8 ; captures the electorate's propensity to seek balance in partisan dominance of the executive and legislative branches of government at the …rst opportunity following each on-year presidential election outcome. The lag sequence X j R t j is the single most politically relevant measure of cumulative change in economic wellbeing; it registers the degree to which national economic performance a¤ects total House seats going to the party holding the presidency at midterms, with the in-party rewarded for good and punished for bad weightedaverage growth of per capita real disposable personal income over the congressional term.
2 Estimation of (1) and small variations of it always yielded estimates of the lag sum weighting parameter b bumping up against the constraint 1, and so the model simpli…es to
2 The speci…cation is then a variant of retrospective rather than prospective political valuation of economic performance in the sense described in my essay "Voting and the Macroeconomy" in the 2006 Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Not a shred of credible evidence supports the so-called 'rational,'purely prospective view of economic valuation and electoral choice.
3 where R t is the arithmetic average of per capita real disposable personal income growth rates over the seven quarters preceding each midterm election:
R t j =7 = log e (R t 1 =R t 8 ) =7 400. Ordinary-least-squares estimates of (2) are Table 1 Coe¢ cient estimate:
= 62 = 0:62 = 1:4 = 9:7 adj:R 2 = :92 (Std. errorjp-value): (20j:01) (0:09j:00) (0:39j:00) (2:4j:00) RM SE = 11
Adjusted for degrees of freedom, 92% of the variation in House Seats won by the in-party at midterm elections is explained statistically by the model. That …t is as good -in fact it is better -than those delivered by equations I have seen for midterm House vote shares, and of course it has the advantage of helping explain the partisan distribution of House seats rather than votes -the former being the electoral outcome of ultimate political interest. At 435 total House members, a party caucus needs 218 members to control House organization. 3 The estimates in Table 1 and it is just that, an informed guess -is that …nal data for whole quarter will be that bad, and maybe worse. Insofar as per capita growth in real disposable personal income is concerned, the United States seems to remain mired in recession. As shown in Table 2 , my model predicts that with a real income growth rate of -3% in 2010q3 the Democrats will win 211 seats -a loss of 45 from the 2008 on-year result that will put them in the minority for the 112th Congress. The model presented in this essay is designed to explain midterm House election outcomes in terms of systematic predetermined and exogenous factors rather than to deliver optimal predictions. For that reason the model does not include trend terms or polling measurements of the public's political sentiments and voting intentions of the sort populating forecasting equations. Trends and related time-coded variables are ad-hoc, statistical junk without scienti…c merit no matter how much they improve statistical …ts or forecasting accuracy in various samples. Polling variables are endogenous. Survey assessments of the popularity of the incumbent president, congressional vote intentions, and kindred poll measurements of political sentiments are driven by one or more of the same factors determining the partisan division of votes and seats -the institutional advantages of incumbency, the electorate's apparent propensity to seek partisan balance, average real income growth over the term, and perhaps other fundamental variables. Although equations dedicated to forecasting ought to yield pretty good predictions, they contribute little or nothing to understanding the underlying causes of election outcomes.
8
The best forecasts in 2010, as in earlier elections, will almost surely be turned in by thick markets betting odds data like those generated at Intrade. 8 Of course betting data tell us absolutely nothing about the root causes of electoral behavior.
Instead they reveal the judgement of market participants -punters who lay money on the table (sometimes very big money) and accordingly have strong incentive to process e¢ ciently all available information relevant to predicting election outcomes.
